Thursday, September 25, 2008

Hume's explanation of Morality

Moral distinctions not derived from reason:
Hume states how nothing but perceptions enter the mind. And these perception, either impressions or ideas, decide virtue and vice. Reason can never be the sole factor in decision because it is only concerned with truth and falsehood. Reasons rigidity does not allow for passion to enter the equation. Right and wrong moral distinctions cannot be established by truth.

Moral distinctions derived from a moral sense:
Hume states how all distinctions are founded upon impressions and sentiments. He describes two states, approbation and disapprobation, as the calm pleasure received from a virtue or a clam pain received from a vice. The discovery of the two states can only be found through response of character and action, which involves a moral sense.

Justice, whether a natural or artificial virtue?
Hume states that justice is an artificial virtue (created by the “circumstances and necessities of mankind) because the original intent or motive behind it (self-interest, public benevolence, and private benevolence) could not and did not exist during human beings original state. Justice was learned over time.

Of the origin of justice and property
Justice, as described in section 2, is artificial and was made in response to the formation of societies. People learned to realize that if disputes and arguments were diminished, society could survive longer. After the idea of justice formed, property followed after it. It followed because of the people’s own self-interest. People wanted to be able to control their own external goods which created a web of property rights and the necessity to follow those rights.

Of the rules, which determine property
Hume states how the original application of property must be based on present possession. This rule of justice is clear, specific, but yet general. Once the system is established, criteria of ownership must be enacted. Such criteria include the following: occupation, prescription, accession, and succession.

Of the transference of property by consent
The transference of property remains limited only by the imagination. Hume states that the property will be there no matter who owns it, but the interests of society are directly affected by the specific guidelines and rules that govern the transfer of the property.

Of the obligation of promises
Hume states that a promise is an artificial virtue. He states that it is a human invention that was only established to better the interests of society. He then adds that without conventions such as resolution, desire, and willingness, there would be no obligation to fulfill the promise. He also states that there must be structure in order to establish the making of the promise.

Some farther reflections concerning justice and injustice
Hume states that the establishment of justice leads to the institution of property. This is important because this means that there is no natural motive to respect that property. It is learned over time. He explains how justice has no degree. It is either just or unjust. This rigidity conflicts with the flexibility of our natural motives.
Difficult passages:
‘Tis evident, that when we praise any actions, we regard only the motives that produced them, and consider the actions as signs or indications of certain principles in the mind and temper. (p.307) 3.2.1
This passage seems difficult. I think it means that we only praise actions which we have positive preconceptions to, but then how do these preconceptions form?
The relation of fitness or suitableness ought never to enter into consideration, in distributing the properties of mankind; but we must govern ourselves by rules, which are more general in their application, and more free from doubt and uncertainty. (p.330) 3.2.4
I do not understand Hume’s reasoning in his application of this principle. I do not want property to be distributed to those who do not know how to upkeep it, or who cannot control it properly.
Interesting passages:
Morality is a subject that interests us above all others: We fancy the peace of society to be at stake in every decision concerning it; and ‘tis evident, that this concern must make our speculations appear more real and solid, than where the subject is, in great measure, indifferent to us. (p.293) 3.1.1
I think that this is interesting because it explains how even if we can’t define morality, the idea of it comforts us. The use of morality can promote a common calm among people. Plus, we always like to measure people’s actions in comparison to a moral standard.
It has been observed that nothing is ever present to the mind but its perceptions; and that all the actions of seeing, hearing, judging, loving, hating, and thinking, fall under this denomination. (p. 293) 3.1.1

I would ask Hume to clarify his positions. I feel like I can read the headings and understand his point just as well as I could without reading. I am having a difficult time finding connections from his examples. I do not see how he is justifying his assertions. Although I do agree with him on most points, I can not clearly say why I do (it is just more out of gut reaction that I agree).

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